University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences Papers: Part A

Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences

2016

An efficient quantum scheme for Private Set
Intersection
Run-hua Shi
University of Wollongong, rshi@uow.edu.au

Yi Mu
University of Wollongong, ymu@uow.edu.au

Hong Zhong
Anhui University

Jie Cui
Anhui University

Shun Zhang
Anhui University

Publication Details
Shi, R., Mu, Y., Zhong, H., Cui, J. & Zhang, S. (2016). An efficient quantum scheme for Private Set Intersection. Quantum
Information Processing, 15 (1), 363-371.

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au

An efficient quantum scheme for Private Set Intersection
Abstract

Private Set Intersection allows a client to privately compute set intersection with the collaboration of the
server, which is one of the most fundamental and key problems within the multiparty collaborative
computation of protecting the privacy of the parties. In this paper, we first present a cheat-sensitive quantum
scheme for Private Set Intersection. Compared with classical schemes, our scheme has lower communication
complexity, which is independent of the size of the server's set. Therefore, it is very suitable for big data
services in Cloud or large-scale client-server networks.
Disciplines

Engineering | Science and Technology Studies
Publication Details

Shi, R., Mu, Y., Zhong, H., Cui, J. & Zhang, S. (2016). An efficient quantum scheme for Private Set
Intersection. Quantum Information Processing, 15 (1), 363-371.

This journal article is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/4985
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Abstract. Private set intersection allows a client to privately compute set intersection with the
collaboration of the server, which is one of the most fundamental and key problems within the
multi-party collaborative computation of protecting the privacy of the parties. In this paper, we
first present a cheat-sensitive quantum scheme for private set intersection. Compared with
classical schemes, our scheme has lower communication complexity, which is independent of the
size of the server’s set. Therefore, it is very suitable for big data services in Cloud or large-scale
client-server networks.
Keywords: Secure Multiparty Quantum Computation; Private Set Intersection; Cheat-sensitive.
1. Introduction
Private set intersection (PSI) is a primitive of secure multi-party computation that enables two parties – a client
and a server – to compute the intersection of their respective sets without disclosing anything about their inputs. The
client will learn the intersection of the two sets and the server will learn nothing [1]. PSI is also known as Private
Matching (PM) [2].
There are many practical applications of PSI (or PM) for protecting the privacy of the parties, such as National
Security and Law Enforcement [3], Genomic Sequences Query [4], Joint Market Investigation [5], PrivacyPreserving Data Mining [6], Matching the Data Outsourced to Cloud Storage Services [7], Location-Based Sharing
Services [8], and other online services [9].
Because of its importance and wide applicability, many schemes for PSI and its variants have been proposed [13,10-15]. Among these schemes, the most efficient PSI scheme requires 𝑂𝑂(𝑛𝑛 + 𝑚𝑚) costs in communication
complexity, which increases linearly with both the client’s set size, 𝑛𝑛, and the server’s set size, 𝑚𝑚. Generally
speaking, the size of the server’s set is larger than that of the client’s set. In order to reduce the communication
complexity further, Wu et al. [2] presented an efficient PM scheme for very large 𝑚𝑚, which requires 𝑂𝑂(𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2 𝑚𝑚)
costs in communication complexity.
As we know, quantum cryptography has the advantage of higher security than classical cryptography. However, to
the best of our knowledge, there is no any quantum scheme for PSI. In this paper, we first proposed a novel quantum
scheme for PSI. The proposed scheme only requires 𝑂𝑂(𝑛𝑛) communication complexity, completely irrespective of
the server set size, 𝑚𝑚. Therefore, it is especially suitable for large-scale client-server networks or Cloud service
models.
2. Proposed Scheme
We informally give a definition of Private Set Intersection first and then present our quantum scheme for Private
Set Intersection.
Definition 1. Private Set Intersection (PSI) - There are two parties, a client and a server. The client inputs a
private set 𝐶𝐶 and the server inputs a private set 𝑆𝑆. After running a PSI procedure, the client outputs the intersection
of their respective sets, i.e., 𝐶𝐶 ∩ 𝑆𝑆, but the server gets nothing except the client’s set size. In addition, PSI should
meet the following requirements.
Correctness. The client finally outputs the exact (possibly empty) intersection of their respective sets.
Client Privacy. The server gets no information about the client’s set elements, except his/her set size.
Server Privacy. The client learns no information about the subset 𝑆𝑆 − 𝐶𝐶 ∩ 𝑆𝑆 (that is, the subset of elements on the
server that are NOT in the intersection of their respective sets), except knowing the subset 𝐶𝐶 ∩ 𝑆𝑆.
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Suppose the client’s private set 𝐶𝐶 = {𝑐𝑐1 , 𝑐𝑐2 , ⋯ , 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 } and the server’s private set 𝑆𝑆 = {𝑠𝑠1 , 𝑠𝑠2 , ⋯ 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 }, and all elements
∗
of the sets 𝐶𝐶 and 𝑆𝑆 lie in ℤ𝑁𝑁
, where ℤ∗𝑁𝑁 = {1,2, … , 𝑁𝑁 − 1} and 𝑁𝑁 is a natural number, which is far larger than 𝑛𝑛 and
𝑚𝑚 (i.e., 𝑁𝑁 ≫ 𝑛𝑛, 𝑚𝑚). In the following scheme, we only consider the honest-but-curious parties, who follow the
protocol (honesty), but record everything they see and try to extract a secret (curiosity). The proposed scheme
consists of 4 steps, which are described in detail as follows:
|0⟩+|𝑐𝑐
Step 1. The client prepares 𝑛𝑛 encoded states, |𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 ⟩= √2 𝑖𝑖⟩ for 𝑖𝑖 = 1 to 𝑛𝑛, where 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 is his/her 𝑖𝑖th private element in

𝐶𝐶 (i.e., 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶 ). Furthermore, the client sends all encoded states to the server by an authenticated quantum
channel [16,17,26,27].
Step 2. After receiving all encoded states sent from the client, the server applies a quantum operator 𝐺𝐺 on each
received state, and then sends them back to the client, where 𝐺𝐺 = −𝑈𝑈0 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 . Here, 𝑈𝑈0 and 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 are unitary operators
[18], defined as follows:
𝑈𝑈0 |𝑥𝑥⟩ = �

|𝑥𝑥⟩ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 ≠ 0
,
−|0⟩ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 = 0

(1)

−|𝑥𝑥⟩ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑆𝑆
,
𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 |𝑥𝑥⟩ = �
|𝑥𝑥⟩ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 ∉ 𝑆𝑆

(2)

where |𝑥𝑥⟩ is any basis state in 𝑁𝑁 -dimensional Hilbert space. That is, 𝑈𝑈0 maps |0⟩ to −|0⟩ and leaves the

remaining |𝑥𝑥⟩ alone, and 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 maps |𝑥𝑥⟩ to −|𝑥𝑥⟩ if 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑆𝑆 and |𝑥𝑥⟩ otherwise. Then we get
|𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 ⟩ = 𝐺𝐺|𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 ⟩
= 𝐺𝐺

|0⟩+|𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ⟩
√2

= −𝑈𝑈0 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆
=−
=�

|0⟩+|𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ⟩
√2

𝑈𝑈0 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 |0⟩+𝑈𝑈0 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 |𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ⟩

−

√2

𝑈𝑈0 |0⟩−𝑈𝑈0 |𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ⟩

−

√2
𝑈𝑈0 |0⟩+𝑈𝑈0 |𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ⟩
√2

|0⟩+|𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ⟩

√2
= �|0⟩−|𝑐𝑐
⟩
√2

𝑖𝑖

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∈𝑆𝑆

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∉𝑆𝑆

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∈𝑆𝑆

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∉𝑆𝑆

.

(3)

Step 3. For each state returned from the server, the client performs an honest test. That is, he/she check whether
|0⟩+|𝑐𝑐
|0⟩−|𝑐𝑐
the superposition in the corresponding encoded state is preserved as follows: √2 𝑖𝑖⟩ or √2 𝑖𝑖⟩. Since the two

possible states are obviously orthogonal and further the client knows the value of 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 , therefore he/she is able to
completely distinguish them by a von Neumann measurement. If the client finds a cheat of the server (that is, the
|0⟩+|𝑐𝑐
|0⟩−|𝑐𝑐
measured result is not √2 𝑖𝑖⟩ or √2 𝑖𝑖⟩), he/she will terminate this protocol; otherwise continue to the next step.
Step 4. The client gets the phase information 𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖) of each returned state by distinguishing it between
|0⟩−|𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ⟩
√2

, i.e., 𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖) = 1 if it is in the state

|0⟩+|𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ⟩
√2

|0⟩+|𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ⟩
√2

and

, and 𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖) = −1 otherwise. Furthermore, if 𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖) = 1, then 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶 ∩

𝑆𝑆; otherwise 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∉ 𝐶𝐶 ∩ 𝑆𝑆. Finally, the client outputs all elements that the phase information is equal to one (i.e.,
{𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 |𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶 ∧ 𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖) = 1 for 𝑖𝑖 = 1 to 𝑛𝑛}). However, the server gets nothing except the size of the set 𝐶𝐶 of the client.

3. Analysis

Correctness. The scheme proposed above clearly and rightly works when the client and the server honestly
execute the protocol. If 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆, it can easily see that 𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖) = 1 by Eq.(3). Therefore, the client rightly outputs the
intersection of their respective sets by 𝑛𝑛 von Neumann measurements. That is, the proposed PSI scheme is correct.
Client Privacy mainly depends on the server’s impossibility of discriminating the encoded quantum state sent
from the client, thank to two basic laws of quantum theory: No-Cloning Theorem which forbids the creation of
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identical copies of an arbitrary unknown quantum state, and Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle which implies that it
is impossible to measure the state of any system without disturbing that system.
|0⟩+|𝑐𝑐
In order to extract the secret information about 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 from the encoded state |𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖⟩= √2 𝑖𝑖⟩, the server must measure the

state |𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 ⟩. However, he cannot perform the equivalent measurement which the client does, because he does not
know 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 . Therefore, if the server measures the encoded state, he will certainly disturb it. In the following section, we
will analyze two measure-based attacks by a dishonest server in detail.
|0⟩+|𝑐𝑐
First, if the server directly measures the encoded state √2 𝑖𝑖⟩ by a simple projective measurement (intercept), the

measured result can be either |0⟩ or |𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ⟩ with the probabilities

1
2

and 12 , respectively. If he gets |𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ⟩ , he can

successfully pass the honest test by re-preparing and returning a new quantum system in the state |𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 ⟩ =

|0⟩+|𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ⟩
√2

(resend). However, if he gets |0⟩, he cannot pass the honest test. In short, this intercept-resend attack will be
discovered in the honest test with the probability of 12. That is, our scheme is cheat sensitive [19,20,21]. In order to

further resist this intercept-resend attack, in principle the client can replace the encoded state |𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 ⟩ =
states of the form

𝑒𝑒 𝒾𝒾𝒾𝒾 |0⟩+|𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ⟩
√2

|0⟩+|𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ⟩
√2

with

[19], where the phase 𝜃𝜃 is a parameter randomly and privately selected by the client.

Since the server does not know the value of 𝜃𝜃, it will be clearly impossible for him to reprepare the correct reply
state after his measurement.
Second, we further discuss a more complicated entangle-measure attack by a dishonest server that he/she is able to
prepare an ancillary system and entangle the ancillary system with the quantum system carried the encoded states by
his local unitary operations, and afterwards he can measure the ancillary system to get the partial information about
the client’s private inputs. For simplicity, we only consider the client’s quantum system in the general state of |0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩
,
√2
where 𝑘𝑘 is a private element of the client’s set 𝐶𝐶. Suppose that the initial state of the ancillary system is |0⟩𝑆𝑆 and the
�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ,
server’s dishonest action when he receives the client’s encoded states can be described by a unitary operator 𝑈𝑈
which acts on the client’s quantum system 𝑐𝑐 and the server’s ancillary system 𝑠𝑠. We can describe it as follows:
�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 |0⟩𝑐𝑐 |0⟩𝑠𝑠 = �𝜂𝜂0 |0⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙0 ⟩𝑠𝑠 + �1 − 𝜂𝜂0 |𝑉𝑉0 ⟩𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ,
𝑈𝑈

(4)

�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 |𝑘𝑘⟩𝑐𝑐 |0⟩𝑠𝑠 = �𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 |𝑘𝑘⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠 + �1 − 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 |𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ,
𝑈𝑈

�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 �|0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩� |0⟩𝑠𝑠 = �𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘 �|0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩�
𝑈𝑈
√2
√2

𝑐𝑐

𝑐𝑐

|𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠

(5)

+ �1 − 𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘 |𝑉𝑉+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ,

where |𝑉𝑉0 ⟩𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 , |𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 and |𝑉𝑉+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 are a vector orthogonal to |0⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙0 ⟩𝑠𝑠 , |𝑘𝑘⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠 and | + 𝑘𝑘⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠 (|+𝑘𝑘⟩ =

respectively, i.e.,

𝑐𝑐 ⟨0|𝑠𝑠 ⟨𝜙𝜙0 |𝑉𝑉0 ⟩𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

𝑐𝑐 ⟨𝑘𝑘|𝑠𝑠 ⟨𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘 |𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

= 0,

= 0,

𝑐𝑐 ⟨+𝑘𝑘|𝑠𝑠 ⟨𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 |𝑉𝑉+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

(6)
|0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩
√2

),

(7)
(8)

= 0.

In order to completely pass the honest test (that is, the returned system 𝑐𝑐 must be

(9)
|0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩
√2

without consideration of the

phase transformation), we can easily deduce that the following condition holds in Eq. (6):
𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘 = 1.

That is,

�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 �|0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩� |0⟩𝑠𝑠 = �|0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩�
𝑈𝑈
√2
√2
𝑐𝑐

(10)

𝑐𝑐

|𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠 .

(11)

In addition, obviously the returned states cannot contain other vectors except the vectors of |0⟩𝑐𝑐 and |𝑘𝑘⟩𝑐𝑐 . Thus, in
order to fully pass the honest test, Eqs. (4) and (5) must be restrained as the following expressions, accordingly:
�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 |0⟩𝑐𝑐 |0⟩𝑠𝑠 = �𝜂𝜂0 |0⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙0 ⟩𝑠𝑠 + �1 − 𝜂𝜂0 |𝑘𝑘⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠 ,
𝑈𝑈
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(12)

�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 |𝑘𝑘⟩𝑐𝑐 |0⟩𝑠𝑠 = �𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 |𝑘𝑘⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠 + �1 − 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 |0⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙0 ⟩𝑠𝑠 .
𝑈𝑈

Given from Eq. (11), when 𝑘𝑘 = 0, it further gets,

�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 |0⟩𝑐𝑐 |0⟩𝑠𝑠 = |0⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙0 ⟩𝑠𝑠 .
𝑈𝑈

It implies,

(14)

𝜂𝜂0 = 1.

Then, we get

(13)

(15)

�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 |𝑘𝑘⟩𝑐𝑐 |0⟩𝑠𝑠 = 𝑈𝑈
�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 �√2(|𝑘𝑘⟩+|0⟩−|0⟩)� |0⟩𝑠𝑠
𝑈𝑈
√2
𝑐𝑐

�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 �√2|+𝑘𝑘⟩ − |0⟩� |0⟩𝑠𝑠
= 𝑈𝑈
𝑐𝑐

�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 |+𝑘𝑘⟩𝑐𝑐 |0⟩𝑠𝑠 − 𝑈𝑈
�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 |0⟩𝑐𝑐 |0⟩𝑠𝑠
= √2𝑈𝑈
= √2|+𝑘𝑘⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠 − |0⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙0 ⟩𝑠𝑠
= √2(

|0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩
√2

(by Eq.(11))

)𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠 − |0⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙0 ⟩𝑠𝑠

= |0⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠 + |𝑘𝑘⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠 − |0⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙0 ⟩𝑠𝑠 .

(16)

If we compute the scalar product between Eqs. (13) and (16), then we will obtain the identity
1 = �1 − 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠⟨𝜙𝜙0 |𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠 + �𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠⟨𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘 |𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠
−�1 − 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠⟨𝜙𝜙0 |𝜙𝜙0 ⟩𝑠𝑠

= �1 − 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠⟨𝜙𝜙0 |𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠 + �𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠⟨𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘 |𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠
−�1 − 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 .

Since 𝑠𝑠⟨𝜙𝜙0 |𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠 ≤ 1 and 𝑠𝑠⟨𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘 |𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠 ≤ 1, so we get
That is,

1 ≤ �1 − 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 + �𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 − �1 − 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 .
1 ≤ �𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 ,

which implies

(17)

(18)
(19)

𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 = 1.

(20)

Thus, we can obtain the following expanded expression

�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 �|0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩� |0⟩𝑠𝑠 = 𝑈𝑈�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐|0⟩𝑐𝑐|0⟩𝑠𝑠+𝑈𝑈�𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠|𝑘𝑘⟩𝑐𝑐|0⟩𝑠𝑠
𝑈𝑈
√2
√2
𝑐𝑐

=

|0⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙0 ⟩𝑠𝑠 +|𝑘𝑘⟩𝑐𝑐 |𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠
√2

.

(21)

Similarly, if we compute the scalar product between Eqs. (11) and (21), then we will obtain

By Eq. (22), it gives

1 = 12 𝑠𝑠⟨𝜙𝜙0 |𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠 + 12 𝑠𝑠⟨𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘 |𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠 .
𝑠𝑠⟨𝜙𝜙0 |𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠

𝑠𝑠⟨𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘 |𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘 ⟩𝑠𝑠

= 1,

= 1.

(22)
(23)
(24)

From Eqs. (23) and (24), it shows that if the server wants to be sure that he passes the honest test, then the final
states of the ancillary system 𝑠𝑠 for any choice of 𝑘𝑘 will coincide with |𝜙𝜙0 ⟩𝑠𝑠 , that is, the states of the ancillary system
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𝑠𝑠 are independent of the secret 𝑘𝑘. Therefore, even though the server performs an entangle-measure attack, he cannot
.
yet obtain any secret information about the secret 𝑘𝑘 from the encoded state |0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩
√2
Server Privacy. If the client honestly executes the protocol, he/she cannot obtain any secret information about the
server’s private set, except knowing 𝐶𝐶 ∩ 𝑆𝑆. If the client is dishonest, it is possible for him/her to perform a cheating
to the server, instead of the true state |0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩
. Accordingly, the
strategy as follows: he/she sends a false state |𝑗𝑗⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩
√2
√2

or |𝑗𝑗⟩−|𝑘𝑘⟩
. However, from the states of |𝑗𝑗⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩
or |𝑗𝑗⟩−|𝑘𝑘⟩
, the client
returned state from the server must be in either |𝑗𝑗⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩
√2
√2
√2
√2

cannot get the right phase information 𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗) or 𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘), while he/she can infer that 𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗) = 𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘) or 𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗) ≠ 𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘), but
not deduce whether 𝑗𝑗 or 𝑘𝑘 belongs to the server’s private set.
We have analyzed the security of proposed protocols in ideal settings. However, in practical settings, there may be
some faults (e.g., noise and error) in the quantum channel and measurement. In order to ensure its security in
practical settings, we can use the fault tolerant technologies, such as decoherence-free states and error-correcting
code, which were introduced in References [22,23]. In addition, please note that we only consider the honest-butcurious parties in our protocols, which is similar to the semi-honesty model in the classical settings. In classical
settings, any secure protocol in semi-honesty model can be correspondingly translated into a secure protocol in
malicious model. However, it still needs to further study how to translate a protocol from semi-honesty model to
malicious model in quantum settings. It is also our future work (especially, the definition of malicious model in
quantum settings).
In addition, the authenticated quantum channel can ensure the security of quantum communications. Like most
existing secure multiparty quantum computations, our scheme needs there is an authenticated quantum channel. This
is the only assumption we need to have for the scheme to work. In principle, we may use a quantum authentication
scheme (QAS) [24] based on Clifford operators introduced in [25] to implement it. We may also use quantum
encryptions combined with classical authenticated keys [26,27]. In addition, we may still ensure the authentication
by sharing the entangled quantum resources in advance or using the detecting (or decoy) particle technologies.
Finally, we analyze the communication costs of the proposed scheme. We can easily see that the client sends and
receives 𝑛𝑛 encoded states, respectively. So the communication complexity is 𝑂𝑂(𝑛𝑛), irrespective of the size of the
server’s set. Compared to the classical PSI schemes with 𝑂𝑂(𝑛𝑛 + 𝑚𝑚) communication complexity, our proposed
scheme has a very significant reduction in the communication complexity due to 𝑂𝑂(𝑛𝑛) communication complexity.
4. Conclusion

In this paper, we first presented a quantum method to solve PSI problem. In the proposed PSI scheme, the client
first prepares 𝑛𝑛 encoded states, and then sends them to the server. After applying 𝑛𝑛 quantum operators, the server
sends these encoded states back to the client. Finally the client performs 𝑛𝑛 von Neumann measurements to privately
choose out all elements of the intersection of their respective sets. During this process, two parties only require to
exchange 𝑛𝑛 quantum states. Obviously, both computation and communication complexities of the proposed scheme
are 𝑂𝑂(𝑛𝑛), which are independent of the server’s set size 𝑚𝑚. Therefore, it is very suitable for big data services in
Cloud or large-scale client-server networks
Acknowledgments. This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos 61173187,
61173188 and 11301002), the Ministry of Education institution of higher learning doctor discipline and scientific
research fund aids a project financially (No.20133401110004), Natural Science Foundation of Anhui Province (Nos
11040606M141 and 1408085QF107), and the 211 Project of Anhui University (Nos 33190187 and 17110099).
References
[1] Freedman, M.J., Nissim, K., Pinkas, B.: Efficient Private Matching and Set Intersection. In Proc. of EUROCRYPT, LNCS
3027, (Interlaken, Switzerland, 2004) 1–19 (2004)
[2] Wu, M.E., Chang, S.Y., Lu, C.J., Sun, H.M.: A communication-efficient private matching scheme in Client-Server model.
Information Sciences 275(10), 348-359 (2014)
[3] Cristofaro, E. De, Tsudik, G.: Fast and Private Computation of Cardinality of Set Intersection and Union. In Proc. of
Financial Crypto, LNCS 6052, (Canary Islands, Spain, 2010) 143–159 (2010)

5

[4] Zhan, J., Cabrera, L., Osman, G., Shah, R.: Using Private Matching for Securely Querying Genomic Sequences. In Proc. of
IEEE Third International Conference on Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust (passat) and Third International Conference On
Social Computing (socialcom), (IEEE, 2011) 1163–1168 (2011)
[5] Li, Y., Tygar, J., Hellerstein, J.: Private matching. In Proc. of Computer Security in the 21st Century, 25–50 (2005)
[6] Chun, J.Y., Hong, D., Jeong, I.R., Lee, D.H.: Privacy-preserving disjunctive normal form operations on distributed sets.
Information Sciences 231(10), 113–122 (2013)
[7] Pervez, Z., Awan, A.A., Khattak, A.M., Lee, S., Huh, E.N.: Privacy-aware searching with oblivious term matching for cloud
storage. Journal of Supercomputing 63(2), 538–560 (2013)
[8] Narayanan, A., Thiagarajan, N., Lakhani, M., Hamburg, M., Boneh, D.: Location privacy via private proximity testing. In
Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2011), (San Diego, CA, USA), (2011)
[9] Bursztein, E., Hamburg, M., Lagarenne, J., Boneh, D.: Openconflict: preventing real time map hacks in online games. In
Proc. of IEEE S&P 2011, 506–520 (2011)
[10] Hazay, C., Lindell, Y.: Efficient protocols for set intersection and pattern matching with security against malicious and
covert adversaries. In Proc. of Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC), LNCS 4948, (New York, USA, 2008), 155–175
(2008)
[11] Liu, L., Cao, Z.: Private matching protocols without error probability. In Proc. of the IEEE International Conference on
Computer Science and Automation Engineering (CSAE), vol. 4, (IEEE, 2011) 363–366 (2011)
[12] Marconi, L., Conti, M., Pietro, R. Di: Cassandra: a probabilistic, efficient, and privacy-preserving solution to compute set
intersection. International Journal of Information Security 10(5), 1–19 (2011)
[13] Kerschbaum, F.: Outsourced private set intersection using homomorphic encryption. In Proc. of ACM ASIACCS 2012, 85
–86 (2012)
[14] Cristofaro, E.D., Tsudik, G.: Experimenting with Fast Private Set Intersection. In Proc. of the 5th International Conference
on Trust & Trustworthy Computing (TRUST 2012), LNCS 7344, 55-73 (2012)
[15] Shao, Z.Y. and Yan, B.: Private set intersection via public key encryption with keywords search. Security and
Communication Networks 8(3), 396-402 (2015)
[16] Barnum, H., Cr´epeau, C., Gottesman, D., Smith, A. and Tapp, A.: Authentication of quantum messages. In Proc. of 43rd
Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 449–458 (2002)
[17] Aharonov, D., Ben-Or, M. and Eban, E.: Interactive proofs for quantum computations. In Proc. of Innovations in Computer
Science, arxiv.org/abs/0810.5375 (2008)
[18] Grover, L. K: A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search. In Proc. of 28th Annual ACM Symposium on
Theory of Computing, 212-219 (1996)
[19] Giovannetti, V., Lloyd, S. and Maccone, L.: Quantum private queries. Phys. Rev. Lett. 100(23), 230502 (2008)
[20] Olejnik, L.: Secure quantum private information retrieval using phase-encoded queries. Phys. Rev. A 84(2), 022313 (2011)
[21] Li, Y.B., Wen, Q.Y., Li, Z.C., Qin, S.J. and Yang, Y.T.: Cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment via pre- and post- selected
quantum states. Quantum Inf. Process. 13(1) 141-149 (2014)
[22] Li, Y.B., Qin, S.J., Yuan, Z., Huang, W., Sun, Y.: Quantum private comparison against decoherence noise. Quantum Inf.
Process. 12(6), 2191-2205 (2013)
[23] Li, Y.B., Wang, T.Y., Chen, H.Y, Li, M.D., Yang, Y.T.: Fault-Tolerate Quantum Private Comparison Based on GHZ States
and ECC. Int. J. Theor. Phys. 52(8), 2818-2825 (2013)
[24] Barnum, H., Cr´epeau, C., Gottesman, D., Smith, A. and Tapp, A.: Authentication of quantum messages. In Proc. of 43rd
Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 449–458 (2002)
[25] Aharonov, D., Ben-Or, M. and Eban, E.: Interactive proofs for quantum computations. In Proc. of Innovations in Computer
Science, arxiv.org/abs/0810.5375 (2008)
[26] Yu, K.F., Yang, C.W., Liao, C.H., Hwang, T.: Authenticated semi-quantum key distribution protocol using Bell states.
Quantum Inf. Process. 13(6), 1457-1465 (2014)
[27] Guan, D.J., Wang, Y.J., Zhuang, E.S.: A practical protocol for three-party authenticated quantum key distribution. Quantum
Inf. Process. 13(11), 2355-2374 (2014)

6

